About once a month, the Royal Air Force scrambles Typhoon fighters for something called a Quick Reaction Alert (QRA). Typically, two Russian nuclear-capable bombers approach Scotland, the RAF aircraft shadow them closely and, at a suitably theatrical moment, the Russians turn away. The episode merits a tiny press release from the Ministry of Defence.
Russia is continuously demonstrating its preparedness to cause mass death on the British mainland
What most people don’t realise is that the Russian aircraft often open their bomb doors, revealing missiles which may, or may not, contain nuclear warheads; and that they line up on specific targets: city centres, nuclear power stations, airports, or other strategic places.
Russia is continuously demonstrating its preparedness to cause mass death on the British mainland. And, unlike the British, who douse all utterances about nuclear matters in copious sangfroid, the Russian state media revels in atomic gruesomeness.
“The explosion of this thermonuclear torpedo by Britain’s coastline,” threatened one Russian TV host in 2022, “will cause a gigantic tsunami wave. Having passed over the British Isles, it will turn whatever might be left of them into a radioactive wasteland”. The broadcast included a computer simulation of a 500-foot wave engulfing Dublin, Belfast, Manchester and Glasgow.
The threat is real. That is why the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), whose publication is imminent, must take seriously the evidence of those who have argued that Britain’s nuclear deterrent may be inadequate for the challenge ahead.
The deterrent consists of nearly 260 warheads, which can be loaded onto Trident missiles fired only from Vanguard class submarines, one of which is kept continuously at sea, its location rigorously concealed. The deterrent is strategic in nature, which cutting through the euphemisms means it could obliterate much of Russia on its own.
The problem we now face, however, is twofold. Both Russia and China have proliferated “sub-strategic” nuclear weapons: torpedoes, missiles, glide bombs and artillery shells which could deliver a low-yield weapon – either to win a land battle, sink an aircraft carrier or “make a point”, by causing a small-scale nuclear explosion somewhere it is unlikely to cause mass casualties.
This gives Vladimir Putin an “escalation ladder” with many rungs, while leaving Britain only with an on-off switch. The UK is, in fact, the only one of the nine nuclear powers (five “official” and four unrecognised within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework) that is limited to a single delivery mechanism.
That would not be a problem if the Unites States, which has also developed sub-strategic nukes, were a 100 per cent reliable ally. But the US is, like it or not, walking away from European collective defence, leaving key Nato allies calling for the creation of a ‘Euro-nuke’, and front-line states such as Poland and even Ukraine rationally weighing the option to develop independent nuclear weapons themselves.
Given the weight of expert evidence submitted to the SDR, we believe it is likely that the report will acknowledge this problem. But the debate about how to respond will only begin on publication, not end.
In response to the Russian threat, and to European demands for credible nuclear umbrella, France has offered to extend its own deterrent to European allies, while Germany has called for the creation of a European-level nuclear capability.
It is not in the UK’s interest to see nuclear weapons proliferate across Europe. Britain could, starting today if it wished to, make a formal commitment to use the Trident missiles for collective defence of our European partners, beyond the pledge offered through Nato.
But to make such a commitment credible, the technical form of the deterrent may have to change. The Vanguard submarines are, of course, capable of firing a single missile with a small warhead in response to a “tactical” strike by Russia. But there are two risks associated with such a move: first, that Russia interprets the launch as a strategic strike and responds accordingly; second, that it gives away the position of the submarine firing it – requiring us to keep two submarines at sea, not one.
Logic, therefore, points to the UK acquiring more diverse ways of delivering a nuclear strike, and altering its doctrine to allow for the use of what the French call “theatre-level” nukes.
In our discussions with France and other European allies about this prospect, it is clear that a bird in the hand is worth many more in the bush: committing to “thinking about” giving the Royal Navy or the RAF smaller, less lethal nuclear weapons is not the same as actually doing it.
So the SDR, together with the forthcoming National Security Strategy, need to take the British electorate on a journey few might have imagined before the twin shocks of the Ukraine war and Trump 2.0.
Our options are limited but real. We could equip the British-French StormShadow missile with a low-yield warhead; we could remanufacture the nuclear bombs and depth charges the RAF and Royal Navy used to carry during the Cold War; or we could join in whatever new solutions the Europeans propose to develop.
But time is tight. If the SDR’s authors conclude the UK needs more options to maintain the credibility of its response to nuclear threats, that will have fiscal implications – because all nuclear weaponry is expensive – and should rightly be the subject of a public debate.
The most common objection to tactical nukes is that, if Russia used one, the UK would most likely respond with overwhelming conventional force – using deep strikes or cyber-attacks to achieve similar results. But it is doubtful that conventional force, particularly by the UK acting alone, can deter Russia from using tactical nuclear weapons. The greater problem is that our allies do not buy that it can.
If you are sitting in Warsaw, Chisinau or Kyiv, nothing reassures you better than the idea that, in a clearly designated European military base, sit aircraft with a nearby store of nuclear bombs or missiles, capable of striking back. Right now, only France can provide those aircraft. And though there are not many of them, this fact alone is likely to give France an outsized influence in the security arrangements of Europe in future, should the UK stay out of the game of “extended deterrence”.
The challenges for a country of France’s size to extend its nuclear umbrella are such that its leaders may sensibly backtrack from modifying their doctrine to cover allies unless Britain assists them. This would confront our Central and Eastern European with no choice but to build nuclear weapons of their own – meaning nuclear proliferation – or else fall victim to Russian nuclear blackmail.
Few of us would willingly add to the world’s arsenal of mass destruction. But the asymmetry between the threat and our defences against it are so strong that urgent action is needed. That is why, once the SDR comes out, the government should seek immediate cross-party agreement – including from minority parties – for the in-principle development of theatre-level nuclear weapons.
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