Is Israel cosying up to Russia? When Eli Cohen, Israel’s foreign minister, spoke to his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov last week, it was the first such call between the countries’ foreign ministers since the start of the war in Ukraine. Israel’s ministry of foreign affairs, Cohen said, was planning to establish a new ‘responsible’ policy with regard to the country and ‘talk less’ about the war in public.
The announcement of the call caused a frenzy, with speculation that Israel wants to adopt a pro-Russia policy. It prompted a public admonition from senior Republican senator, and ally of Israel’s newly reinaugurated prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Lindsey Graham. Graham tweeted ‘The idea that Israel should speak less about Russia’s criminal invasion of Ukraine is a bit unnerving.’ He continued, calling Lavrov ‘a representative of a war criminal regime that commits war crimes on an industrial scale every day.’
Cohen’s decision to hold a call was surprising for another reason: the tide of antisemitism Russia’s war in Ukraine appears to have led to. Conspiracy theories that Jews are responsible for the war have emerged in Russia. Jews have been increasingly blamed for Russia’s difficulties in the war, prompting Moscow’s exiled Chief Rabbi to urge Russian Jews to leave the country. So far, roughly 20,000 Jews (out of about 165,000 Jews living in Russia) have left. Antisemitic tropes have been pushed by government officials, Russian media, think tanks with government connections and pro-Russian, usually far-right, ‘influencers’. In May, Lavrov repeated the baseless claim that Hitler was partially Jewish, in an attempt to portray Ukrainian president Zelensky, who is Jewish, as a Nazi. This understandably caused outrage in Israel – so why is Israel reaching out to Russia?
Going forward, Israel’s policy will be less pro-Russia, and more pro-Israel, looking after its own interests
Prior to the war in Ukraine, Israel enjoyed positive relations with Russia. Bibi and Putin’s bond allowed Israel to operate against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria and Iran. This necessitates a certain level of quiet consent from Russia, that holds considerable power in the region. However, under the leadership of Bibi’s more centrist predecessors Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid, relations between the two countries suffered significantly following the start of the war.
Israel initially refrained from publicly addressing the war. It did not want to alienate Russia, but was also reluctant to side with a country that had been condemned by the West. Israel’s government gradually adopted a more favourable rhetoric towards Ukraine and criticised Russia’s behaviour. It has been providing Ukraine with non-offensive equipment and humanitarian aid, although it refrained from providing weapons, and resisted requests from Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to arm Ukraine with its anti-rocket defence system, Iron Dome.
Bibi’s new government was sworn in on 29 December. His right-wing-orthodox administration seems intent on undoing many of the policies implemented by its centrist predecessors: from health, to justice, communications, environment and transportation. Nearly every ministry faces major reforms.
Israel’s decision to seek to repair its relationship with Russia is another example of this shake-up. Putin’s regime employs antisemitic propaganda to justify its aggression against Ukraine, commits war crimes, and is ostracised by every liberal democracy. Surely this increases the risk of alienating Israel from its closest allies?
But Israel think it’s worth the risk – largely because of Israel’s anxieties about Iran. The war has brought Iran and Russia – both suffering from international isolation and sanctions – closer. Russia has reportedly been using Iranian drones in Ukraine. In turn, it has agreed to provide Iran with political, military and economic support.
At a time when the West’s nuclear deal with Iran hangs in the balance, this new strategic relationship between Russia and Iran is a major concern for Israel. Bibi, who has long been accused of having an obsession with Iran, is fearful that Russia’s support will make it possible for Iran to achieve nuclear capabilities. In a call with Putin in December, Bibi expressed apprehension about the alliance between Russia and Iran.
The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a short statement about Cohen’s talk with Lavrov on 3 January. The succinct notice said regional and bilateral issues, and the ‘importance of the relationship between the two countries’, were discussed. What was missing is far more telling of Israel’s new policy: Israeli media reported that the two also talked about the Netanyahu government’s concern about Russia’s cooperation with Iran.
Israel’s decision to prioritise regional interests means that it will need to tread a fine line between rebuilding relations with Russia, without supporting, politically and militarily, its war conduct. It will have to find a balance between forging a close enough relationship with Russia to distance it from Iran, without alienating Israel’s allies. Key among these is the US, which is already concerned by far-right and anti-democratic elements in the Israeli government. To find this balance, Israel may try to establish itself as a negotiator between Russia and Ukraine.
Going forward, Israel’s policy will be less pro-Russia, and more pro-Israel, looking after its own interests. But Bibi ‘the magician’ may find it impossible to have his cake and eat it too.
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