Reading the Sunday newspapers, you could be forgiven for thinking an earth-shattering agreement was reached in Paris – one which outdid even the Kyoto Protocol in the way of binding agreement across the world on climate action. The deal was heavy on political will and ambition (or at least expressions thereof) but as many experts are now queuing up to say, offered little in the form of hard targets and binding commitments around reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
This is of course a pragmatic approach to doing policy at the global level, particularly given the extreme variation in capacity and priorities between countries operating at vastly different levels of development. If the EU had had its way however, all of targets laid down in Paris would have been legally binding. And in the meantime, Brussels is only too happy to take the lead in imposing its own, a pattern it has honed since Kyoto and is likely to up the ante in over the coming years.
In the weeks running up to the climate summit, the European Commission had taken the unusual step of publicly calling on the US to commit to a legally binding agreement. Secretary of State John Kerry –mindful of an intemperate Congress- demurred, declaring that whatever happened the deal would not amount to an international treaty. Indeed, the EU came to Paris proposing a global goal of a 60pc reduction in carbon emissions by 2050, reviews of climate targets every five years, and further binding carbon cuts of at least 40% on 1990 levels by 2030.
If the latter of these objectives sounds familiar, it’s because this is exactly what the EU itself proposed and agreed for the 28-member bloc last year. The 2030 Climate and Energy Framework is a pragmatic improvement on its 2020 predecessor by allowing member states to decide their own energy mix without making targets on renewables and energy efficiency legally binding at the national level. But it recommitted to a mandatory target for reducing carbon emissions, increasing it to a minimum of 40pc by 2030.
Crucially, the EU’s framework agreement also included a ‘flexibility’ clause allowing it to revisit its 40pc target after the Paris summit if there was not sufficiently acceptable agreement across all countries on a similar binding agreement. It is not immediately clear how satisfied the European Commission are with the wider deal. In the margins of the summit and in advance of the final agreement, the EU and a group of developing countries across Asia, the Caribbean and Pacific known as the ACP made its own joint declaration. This effectively endorsed the EU’s original proposal, while calling on the rest of the negotiating parties to back its stance. It is not the first time the EU has grouped together with developing countries in an attempt to wield its clout and push other developed states into supporting more ambitious climate targets.
Where the EU’s ambition fell short on carbon cuts however, it was exceeded on global warming limits. The 2030 framework was based on an objective of restricting the earth’s warming to a minimum of 2 degrees Celsius; the Paris deal pledges to work towards 1.5 degrees instead.
This will no doubt provide the impetus many in the Commission and European Parliament need to trigger the flexibility clause and set the ball rolling for a renegotiation of the 40pc target. There will of course be countries (like Poland) potentially seeking to revise this downwards, and the last UK Government itself backed the binding 40pc minimum threshold, so it is difficult to predict where the dust will eventually settle. But it is clear that where the world is not always willing to act collectively on climate action, the EU most certainly always is.
@AllieRenison is the Head of Europe and Trade Policy for the Institute of Directors
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