France

The government’s Sarkozy problem (and other euro dilemmas)

This week’s European Council meeting has been analysed by diplomats and commentators alike, but a number of issues have not been brought out as clearly as they need to be. The first is that Britain will now achieve political advantage, at the cost of economic setback, if the euro collapses. Although the government insists both that it is still wedded to the success of the euro and that it will not be isolated in Europe now or in the future, the simple fact is that eurofailure will ensure that efforts to organise among the 26, rather than the full 27, will finish. The economic costs would be considerable — possibly

James Forsyth

Clegg blames the Tory Eurosceptics

Nick Clegg has just given a quite astonishing interview to Andrew Marr in which he accused David Cameron of being incapable of getting a good deal for Britain because of pressures from within the Conservative parliamentary party. When Marr asked him if things would have been different if Lib Dems had been in Brussels, Clegg said they would have been because he is ‘not under the same constraints from my parliamentary party.’ Clegg described Cameron as being trapped between the ‘intransigence’ of the French and Eurosceptics in the Conservative party. Intriguingly, the deputy Prime Minister blamed the French for there being no negotiation about the British asks. This suggests that

Ten myths about Cameron’s EU veto

The EU veto that Cameron pulled in the early hours of Thursday morning has been widely misunderstood on all sides. Here are the 10 most common myths: 1. Because of Cameron’s veto, Britain lost a seat at the negotiating table. Not true. The UK was never itself going to take part in the Merkozy pact (and potentially be subject to EU sanctions), and therefore not in the monthly, parallel EU meetings that will begin in January, either. Even if he had approved the Treaty changes, Cameron still would not have had a seat at the table. Wider political challenges aside, the veto didn’t change anything structurally in terms of UK

Fraser Nelson

Britain and isolation

The word ‘isolation’ is used a lot in today’s newspapers, as if Cameron walking away from the ongoing EU implosion were a self-evident disaster. Pick up the Guardian and you see Britain cast as a leper, a status conferred on her thanks to a tragic miscalculation by a Prime Minister whose sole aim was to assuage his swivel-eyed Tory MPs and get back on Bill Cash’s Christmas card list. Orwell would have great fun with the language that accompanies the Euro project: trying to suck up to its tiny elite is seen as a country being outward looking. A PM more focused on the people who sent him to office is

What Cameron can do next

What now? That’s the question. This morning it looks not like 17 versus 10, but like 1 versus 26, which is a cold and lonely place for Britain to be. But it is also the right place to be. David Cameron asked for a little and got less. He had to act as he did and will reap the benefit electorally and among his MPs. Labour’s position is not just politically weak, but also unrealistic: it has been clear for weeks it was not possible to run a ‘periphery strategy’ as the 10 states outside the Euro have different incentives to Britain and different long-term aims. And the idea that

A dozen questions for after the Brussels summit

Cameron will be depicted in tomorrow’s press as either a Tory Boudicca or an Essex Bulldog (© Tristram Hunt), depending on your point of view. I suspect the truth is somewhere in between. Cameron did not go in swinging a handbag, although it will suit No10 to make out that he did. But Labour’s caricature of him storming off and wasting the veto certainly doesn’t ring true to me. An EU27 deal was never likely, and EU17 deal always was. Cameron, on their account, just seems to be being blamed for what was going to happen all along. In any case, we are still trying to assemble the pieces of

What could Cameron have done differently?

It is hard not to see the results of last night’s European meeting as the first step towards a fundamentally different — and much looser — relationship between Britain and the EU. The UK, which for centuries has fought to keep any one power from dominating the continent, and for decades has sought to prevent a two-speed Europe from emerging, is now going to have to accept both. It also seems that it will have to protect itself from some form of fiscally-shaped missile against the City.   The irony is that the PM did not apparently push for any UK-only protection of the City, but a broader protocol such

Alex Massie

Annals of French Diplomacy

This is scarcely the most important part of today’s EU shenanigans but, post DSK and all that, one must admire French diplomatic flair when it comes to this sort of thing: The French are very angry – one French diplomat says that Britain is acting “like a man who wants to go to a wife-swapping party without taking his own wife”. Correct or not, this is nicely put. One’s hard-pressed to imagine an FCO or State Department suit expressing his frustration in quite such colourful terms. The temptation to make sweeping nationalist generalisations on the back of an off-the-cuff remark such as this should, naturally, be resisted. [Thanks to LM]

The Merkozy Plan fails to convince

A day or so ago, the markets were rising in anticipation of what might be achieved at this Brussels summit. But this morning they’re mostly either unmoved, or — as in the case of borrowing costs in Italy and Spain — shifting in unpropitious directions. No-one, it seems, has been won over by yet another night of political bargaineering in Brussels. And understandably so. None of the measures mooted this morning are particularly concrete; all have a sogginess about them. More cash will be transferred to the European Financial Stability Facility, but it’s still some distance short of the €1 trillion that was, ahem, ‘announced’ at the end of October.

James Forsyth

A defining moment

David Cameron’s use of the veto in the early hours of this morning changes the British political landscape. The first thing to stress is that if the euro collapses it will not be because of the British veto. The deal agreed between the 17 eurozone countries and six of those nations who still want to join it does not address the single currency’s fundamental problems.   What is, perhaps, most intriguing about what happened in the early hours of this morning is that Sarkozy and Merkel chose to put Cameron in this position. In truth, Cameron was not asking for that much. But Sarkozy and Merkel were not prepared to

Fraser Nelson

Cameron says ‘No’

It looks like Britain could be heading for renegotiation with the EU sooner rather than later. The UK, Hungary, Czechs and Swedes last night stayed out of a 27-member EU Treaty. ‘I don’t want to put it in front of my parliament,’ said Cameron. But in an historic move, the deal is going ahead anyway, with 23 members: the Eurozone, plus the six states who want to join. ‘We will achieve the new fiscal union,’ said Angela Merkel. Nicholas Sarkozy is upbeat saying it has been an ‘historic summit’ which will change the EU ‘radically’.  If so, then Owen Paterson is right in his interview with James Forsyth in the

Cameron’s Europlan comes together

The Tory party may not like it, but David Cameron is now finally following a sensible EU policy. As today’s summit in Brussels starts, the Prime Minister appears to have decided what really matters to the UK, and realised that he needs to play nice with the Germans and French. At the top of the PM’s priority list — a priority voiced by Michael Howard on the Today Programme earlier — is avoiding the collapse of the euro. The consequences of a collapse on Britain’s economy are incalculable, but everyone knows they would be profound. Second comes the protection of the City. A Euroland tax on financial transactions would damage

Yes, Virginia, History Matters: Eurozone Edition

Broadly speaking, there are two ways of viewing the eurozone crisis: it’s a problem of economics or a problem of politics. Neither explanation quite suffices, of course, since it is both but the emphasis you place on economics vs politics plays a part in how you’ll view the situation and how likely you are to think there’s any kind of solution that can satisfy the politics and the economics of the situation. Which is by way of suggesting that plenty of American commentators seem to think the problem is easy to solve and the main thing lacking in europe is the political will to do something about it. (Exhibit A:

Alex Massie

Club Rules, Brussels Edition

Ben Brogan’s latest post offers a revealing glimpse into the oddness of the eurosceptic mind. He begins: To the dismay of many of his colleagues preoccupied by the euro crisis, the Prime Minister has been adept at nurturing strong personal relationships with Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. Instead of confrontation he has engaged constructively with them, to the extent that they listen to him and are willing to consider his attempts to press the British interest. The German chancellor was delighted to discover that Mr Cameron was not the swivel-eyed euro loon she had feared, but a charming and reasonable young man. The French president meanwhile bonded with mon ami

A tale of two cities | 2 December 2011

Nicolas Sarkozy is grudgingly admired by French socialists as a political fighter, capable of thriving even in the most desperate situation. David Cameron is coming to understand what they mean. It is the best of times and the worst of times between Paris and London. Two months ago, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy assumed the victor’s garlands in Benghazi; today, they met at odds, if not yet in animosity, over the contested logic of ever closer union in Europe. Sarkozy appears to have got his wish: the 17 countries of the Eurozone will deepen their economic and political relations in an attempt to save the single currency — and with it, he

Sarko’s renaissance

When David Cameron sits down for lunch with Nicolas Sarkozy today, he is bound to ask his host how the presidential election is going. In response, President Sarkozy is likely to break into one his wide-faced smiles, and begin moving about energetically, as he tends to do when he is excited. Forget the polls that put Francois Hollande ahead in a two-way race. It is too early to tell what people really think and, crucially, it won’t be a two-person race. It is a five-person, two-round election. And so far, Sarkozy is doing very well. Besides Sarkozy and Hollande, four other candidates could make a difference to the outcome: Marine

Tobin tactics

The biggest bone of contention between the UK and its EU allies these days is the ‘Tobin tax’, the idea of levying a tax on financial transactions. To the UK this is folly. Unless it is levied globally, a tax will force business to move elsewhere. And there is a greater chance of Silvio Berlusconi being elected ECB chief than the Tobin tax being levied globally.   Based on the experiences of Sweden in the 1990s, the tax will achieve none of what its proponents believe it will — and at a considerable cost to Britain’s and Europe’s economy, as companies look to list elsewhere to avoid it. As Ryan

How can Cameron protect our interests in Europe in the short term?

Chatting to people in Brussels last week, I couldn’t help feeling that David Cameron’s EU problem is one of timing. The PM will probably be able to piece together a repatriation package that includes measures such as a withdrawal from the over-implemented Working Time Directive and a reduction in the EU budget. But none of this is likely to be enough for his party. Indeed, I suspect the budget won’t be finalised until two minutes to midnight during the Lithuanian EU Presidency in 2013. Add to this the Tobin Tax, where there seems to be little leeway for the British government. Barosso, Merkel and Sarkozy are determined to introduce it,

Chagrin d’amour

The horror of love: Nancy Mitford’s first fiancé was gay; her husband, Peter Rodd, was feckless, spendthrift and unsympathetic, and her great amour, Gaston Palewski, was endlessly unfaithful. She met him during the war in London and was in love with him for the rest of her life. Palewski was Charles de Gaulle’s right-hand man. He organised the French Resistance in London and commanded the Free French forces in East Africa. After the war, he was appointed De Gaulle’s chief of staff and he became known as the sinister éminence grise behind De Gaulle’s presidency. He and Nancy shared a love of France, beauty and jokes. He was never faithful