Don’t write off the Russian air force

The Russian air force’s  failure to establish air superiority over Ukraine – and the consequent inability of its fighter and bomber aircraft to meaningfully affect the course of the war – has been one of the defining features of the invasion so far.   

It has even become almost a given in policy and public discussion that Russian airpower is a busted flush. But recent research conducted by RUSI in Ukraine shows that in fact Russia conducted hundreds of strike sorties and fighter patrols deep inside Ukrainian airspace during the first three days of the invasion – which suggests it would be a dangerous mistake to underestimate Russian airpower as the war continues.  

During the first days of the invasion, Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries were successfully jammed by Russian electronic attack. The Ukrainians were simultaneously forced to urgently relocate their mobile SAMs and radars to avoid missile and aircraft strikes. This meant that Ukraine had no effective ground-based air defences for the first two days of the invasion, and Russian fighters caused serious losses among Ukrainian air force fighter pilots, who were left desperately trying to hold back Russian strike aircraft.  

In air-to-air clashes, Russian fighters completely outmatched their Ukrainian opponents. The Russian Su-35S and Su-30SM both have radars with many times the effective range of the older models fitted to Ukrainian Su-27 and Mig-29 fighters. They also carry R-77-1 active-radar guided air-to-air missiles that have a much longer effective range and more tactical flexibility than the R-27R semi-active radar guided missiles available to Ukrainian pilots.   

Russian fighter aircraft also vastly outnumbered their Ukrainian counterparts, who were forced to fly very low to try to use ‘terrain masking’ to get close enough to fire their missiles. This made it harder for high-flying Russian fighter patrols to reliably detect and track Ukrainian fighters. But it also further increased the two forces’ range disparity. Missiles launched from fighters flying at low altitude and lower speeds have much less kinetic energy – and therefore much shorter effective range – than ones launched from fighters flying at high altitude and higher speeds. This is because missiles fired at low altitude start out at a slower airspeed at launch, then have to climb against gravity to reach high flying targets, and have to do so starting in the much denser air at low altitudes, which creates more aerodynamic drag. Consequently, despite the courage of the Ukrainian pilots and their effective use of terrain that allowed them to claim a few kills, they lost many more aircraft in return.   

It was only from roughly the third day of the invasion, when Ukrainian surface to air missile systems were relocated, reset and where necessary repaired, that Ukraine prevented Russia rapidly establishing air superiority. Radar-guided, mobile surface to air systems quickly started to inflict serious losses on Russian aircraft flying at medium and high altitude inside Ukrainian airspace, forcing them to start flying very low to avoid radar detection. Soon, the hundreds of Ukrainian man portable air defence systems (MANPADS) made daytime and night operations prohibitively dangerous at very low altitudes by mid-March too. Consequently, by April, Russia had largely stopped flying penetrating sorties beyond the Ukrainian frontlines with both fixed wing jets and helicopters. This left only their relatively limited stockpiles of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles to try and conduct a strategic air campaign – and until recently Russia failed to achieve a strategically decisive outcome with these weapons.  

The Russian attempts to use its air force for the suppression and destruction of enemy air defences has also largely failed.Anti-radiation missiles (which home in on the energy emitted by radars) like the Kh-31P are good at forcing surface to air missile operators to turn off their radars and relocate to avoid being hit, but generally have a low probability of hard kills. Russia has fired hundreds of these anti-radiation missiles from fighters and fighter bombers since the beginning of the invasion, but has only succeeded in knocking out a few Ukrainian surface to air systems. But these Ukrainian missile systems are being slowly attritted by Russian drones such as the Orlan-10, which can locate these air defences and then call down either artillery or missile strikes near the frontline.  

Without the ability to penetrate Ukrainian airspace, Russia’s fighter bombers and attack helicopters have been limited to strikes with precision guided missiles against fixed targets like ammunition dumps and command centres close to the frontlines, and unguided bomb and rocket-lobbing attacks against rough grid locations where Ukrainian troops and vehicles are reported. They have not been able to unleash anything like the sustained and relatively accurate bombing campaign they used so brutally but effectively against rebel and Daesh forces in Syria since 2015. This has been a critical factor in allowing Ukraine to sustainably operate HIMARS rocket launchers and other long range artillery systems without significant losses, and to rapidly move their forces and logistics where needed on different fronts.   

Russian fighter patrols, however, have been able to operate at high altitude fairly close to Ukrainian lines, and have proven extremely lethal against Ukrainian attack aircraft trying to conduct rocket and bomb strikes against Russian positions. The Russian Su-35S fighters and more recently the large Mig-31BM interceptors have been a particular problem, equipped with very long-range missiles that can take out low flying Ukrainian jets from a distance that makes them almost immune to retaliation.  

Herein lies the reason why, despite the ineffectiveness of Russian airpower so far in this war, the West needs to urgently reinforce Ukrainian air defence capabilities. It is only Ukraine’s mobile surface to air systems – especially the SA-11 – that have prevented Russian airpower from having a major and potentially decisive impact on Ukraine’s ability to successfully gain the initiative on the ground. These systems are still largely those that Ukraine started the war with. Western military aid has (for good reason) overwhelmingly concentrated on the ground war so far. However, if the Ukrainian SAMs are allowed to run out of ammunition and/or be slowly destroyed to the point that they cannot hold back Russian jets, then Ukraine’s hard-won progress on land could be at risk.   

Russia’s latest long range missile bombardment campaign is also potentially a very serious problem. While Russian stocks of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles are insufficient for a decisive and sustained bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure, they have been bolstered by hundreds of cheap Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munitions since late-September. These weapons lack the destructive power of larger missiles, and are comparatively easy to shoot down individually, but they have added critical mass to Russia’s strike campaign against Ukrainian electricity and water infrastructure. While cruise missiles and ballistic missiles are hitting large power stations, hydro-electric facilities and other pieces of major infrastructure, the Shahed-136s have been attacking much smaller and more numerous electricity substations, administrative offices and pumping stations. Millions of Ukrainian civilians now face the prospect of winter with limited or no electricity and running water. In the countryside people can burn wood and melt snow or use wells, but in the cities things will be much harder. Ukraine urgently needs additional MANPADS, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns like the German Gepard, and western surface to air systems to protect its remaining infrastructure and repair efforts.   

The recent announcement by the MoD that the UK is giving 1,000 more surface to air missiles to Ukraine is encouraging. As is the US Department of Defense’s commitment to providing additional Avenger, HAWK and Stinger air-defence systems.   

These announcements show that at least in the UK and the US, key decision makers are aware of the need to bolster Ukrainian air defences as a matter of urgency. But far more is needed. Countries like Germany, Sweden, France and Switzerland have so far struggled to match their public statements of support for Ukraine with weapons deliveries at scale. Bolstering Ukrainian air defences now offers a politically low-risk, fully defensive way to help Ukraine by providing the equipment needed to stave off Russian airpower and prevent missiles raining down on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure this winter.