Jonathan Powell was the most durable of Tony Blair’s inner circle — and, in the affairs of Northern Ireland, much the most influential.
Jonathan Powell was the most durable of Tony Blair’s inner circle — and, in the affairs of Northern Ireland, much the most influential. He remained in post long after the other Blairites de la première heure such as Alastair Campbell, Anji Hunter and Peter Mandelson had departed the scene. The most important career civil servants, such as Sir John Holmes and Sir David Manning, did their stints and rotated out. Powell thus became ‘last man standing’ and was a key player in the triumphant denouement of May 2007, as Martin McGuinness finally lay down with Ian Paisley.
Powell duly takes his place in the very front rank of prime ministerial aides. His historic role even exceeded that of Sir Alfred (‘Andy’) Cope, Lloyd George’s backchannel to Michael Collins during the Irish War of Independence of 1919-21. For sheer importance, he perhaps bears comparison with Neville Chamberlain’s amanuensis, Sir Horace Wilson, who also started out in the permanent Whitehall machine.
He dedicates his memoir ‘to the people of Northern Ireland who have suffered so much’. But as No 10 Chief of Staff, he spent much of the last decade facilitating the very people who had dished out the lion’s share of that suffering — the Sinn Fein/IRA high command. The index is highly revealing. There are more references to Gerry Adams than to David Trimble and Ian Paisley combined. The number of references to the IRA dwarfs those to Sinn Fein. Indeed, the references to the IRA exceed those to the UUP, DUP, UKUP, PUP, UDP, Alliance Party, SDLP, and Women’s Coalition taken together.
Powell’s account is therefore dominated by two questions. Firstly, were Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness serious about making peace? Secondly, having tacitly accepted there wouldn’t be a united Ireland in this generation, how vulnerable were they to internal challenge within the republican movement — and how much of a price had to be paid to sustain them?
Inevitably, one can only write truly interestingly on dealings with a clandestine militaristic elite such as the Provisionals by reference to secret intelligence.

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