In the America of the 1950s, one question dominated foreign policy: ‘Who lost China?’ The Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the defeat of America’s ally, the Kuomintang regime, provoked agonised debate about the principles that should guide statecraft – the balance between containment and pushback, the relative importance of winning hearts and minds or prevailing by strength of arms.
The question that we might ask today is: ‘Who lost Ukraine?’ Of course, the war between Kyiv and Moscow is not over. Ukraine’s army continues to fight with a tenacious courage that is inspiring. Volodymyr Zelensky’s diplomatic efforts to maximise support for resistance are unflagging. But all the winds blowing now are ominous for Ukraine.
The negotiations between US and Russian officials which started in Saudi Arabia this week – with Ukraine not just sidelined but shunned – seemed to portend a division of territory to suit Vladimir Putin, not Ukraine’s people. The demand from Team Trump that the US get its hands on mineral revenues from Ukraine in return for military and financial support seems grimly transactional rather than mutually beneficial. And the US President’s claims that Ukraine could have resolved this conflict far earlier, and thus bears responsibility for its people’s suffering, are chilling.
Faced with Trump’s actions, European leaders, not surprisingly, have responded with outrage. They feel they have contributed as much to the war effort between them as the US has done. They are naturally fearful, too, that they have the most to lose from a poor settlement with Putin because they live on Russia’s doorstep.
Those fears are not irrational.
Comments
Join the debate for just $5 for 3 months
Be part of the conversation with other Spectator readers by getting your first three months for $5.
UNLOCK ACCESS Just $5 for 3 monthsAlready a subscriber? Log in